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Abstract 
 
Individuals’ information security awareness (ISA) 
plays a critical role in determining their security-
related behavior in both organizational and private 
contexts. Understanding this relationship has 
important implications for individuals and 
organizations alike who continuously struggle to 
protect their information security. Despite much 
research on ISA, there is a lack of an overarching 
picture of the concept of ISA and its relationship with 
other constructs. By reviewing 40 studies, this study 
synthesizes the relationship between ISA and its 
antecedents and consequences. In particular, we (1) 
examine definitions of ISA; (2) categorize 
antecedents of ISA according to their level of origin; 
and (3) identify consequences of ISA in terms of 
changes in beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and actual 
security-related behaviors. A framework illustrating 
the relationships between the constructs is provided 
and areas for future research are identified.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In today’s digital world, which is characterized by 
a strong reliance on information systems (IS), 
organizations continuously aim to uphold their 
information security. To protect IS and organizational 
information assets at the individual level, information 
security awareness (ISA) is considered a crucial 
factor in influencing secure behavior [7, 13]. In 
general, ISA considers an individual’s knowledge 
and understanding of topics related to information 
security (e.g., security risks and threats, 
organizational security objectives, procedures, and 
policies) [37, 39, 42]. 
To attain deeper knowledge of individuals’ ISA, 
IS scholars have carried out research to conceptualize 
the construct (e.g., [37]) and to analyze the associated 
antecedent and outcome factors through the lens of 
their respective discipline (e.g., [7, 13, 14]).  
Despite the considerable advancements in this 
research area, several important issues remain to be 
addressed. First, some studies refer to the term ISA as 
a cognitive state of mind in the form of knowledge 
and understanding [7], a continuous intra-
organizational process to achieve this state of mind 
[43], and/or some kind of security-related behavior 
[14], calling for clarification of the concept of ISA. 
Second, since multiple factors related to ISA were 
examined, a framework for consolidating them and 
building a holistic view of ISA is needed. Related to 
this issue, very different types of antecedents were 
identified, which range from individual 
characteristics through organizational and regulatory 
awareness-raising activities to software applications 
with awareness-features (e.g. [21, 26, 38, 43]). Yet, 
the different levels from where they influence ISA 
are not well established, which raises the issue of 
how to utilize these factors to increase an individual’s 
ISA in an effective manner. 
In a similar way, several consequences and 
outcomes of ISA were studied, including belief 
factors, attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual 
behaviors, but how they are organized and 
interrelated is not clear, either (for instance, prior 
literature reviews allegedly deal with ISA but rather 
consider security behavior; cf. [30]). Without an 
organization of factors, it is difficult to use them to 
develop and implement adequate action plans to 
manage information security.  
To address these issues, this study provides a 
review on ISA, including its definition, its 
antecedents, and its outcomes. Building on the 
review, the relationships between the factors are 
illustrated in a framework and further research 
opportunities are identified. Thus, the research 
objectives include (1) the integration of research in 
the behavioral information security field and the 
development of a comprehensive view on ISA, (2) 
the organization of the antecedents and outcomes of 
ISA to better understand their impact, and (3) the 
provision of prescriptions for future research.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Next, the methodology for identifying, 
selecting and classifying articles is described. The 
third section reports the findings of the review 
followed by the provision of an integrative 
framework and identification of eight prescriptions 
for future research. Finally, implications and 
limitations are discussed.  
 
2. Research methodology  
 
This study follows the common approaches of a 
literature review (e.g., [45]). In the first step, the 
search criteria are specified, the journal pool, search 
string and time range are selected, and articles are 
extracted. Next, the unit of analysis and coding 
scheme are determined, i.e. constructs are coded and 
categorized. Finally, the data is analyzed. A detailed 
description of these steps follows.  
With regard to the specification of search criteria, 
the following inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
applied. First, only studies in the information security 
domain are considered, whereas other topics such as 
physical security are not discussed. The second 
criterion relates to the individual-level, as we 
consider only employees’ and IS users’ ISA. Other 
levels of research such as from a social perspective 
are excluded. Third, this study analyzes empirically 
tested or proposed behavioral studies only, which 
excludes other types of research such as design 
studies and descriptive studies. Fourth, to be 
included, studies needed to have a construct related to 
ISA, which means that studies considering awareness 
without a construct or merely mentioning its 
importance are not considered. Finally, to improve 
rigor, the focus of this review is on peer-reviewed 
academic research, which excludes practitioner 
articles, dissertations, and books. 
To ensure a rigorous and systematic search [45], a 
meta-search engine that integrates search results from 
several academic literature databases (see 
www.litsonar.com) was used. Here, all 109 
publication outlets of the “Association for 
Information Systems (AIS) Toplist” were selected 
and then searched whether a publication contained 
the term ‘awareness’ in the title, abstract or keywords 
by directly accessing the outlet or generating search 
queries for the following databases: ACM Digital 
Library, AISeL, EBSCO Business Source Complete, 
ScienceDirect, and IEEEXplore. Further search 
options included that no restrictions for a time period 
were set and that only peer-reviewed articles should 
be considered. By using ‘awareness’ as a broad 
search term, a search result as comprehensive as 
possible was generated, i.e. 1832 potentially relevant 
publications were identified in total. These articles 
were manually examined to filter out those 
publications that did not meet our previously 
described inclusion and exclusion criteria. This 
filtering process resulted in 26 conceptual and 
empirical articles. Next, these articles were used to 
conduct backward and forward searches resulting in 
additional 32 articles, of which 14 were selected 
following the previously described filtering criteria.  
The unit of analysis considers constructs and their 
causal relationships including the following items: 
(1) explicit definitions of awareness constructs, (2) 
antecedents, and (3) outcomes. The coding results of 
the final set of 40 selected publications on ISA 
including authors, publication outlet, and their 
allocation to the three criteria are presented in Table 
1 in the appendix. 
 
3. Research findings 
 
In this section, findings from the content analysis 
are reported, including a categorization of definitions, 
antecedents, and outcomes of ISA. 
 
3.1 Definitions of ISA  
 
By analyzing the concept of awareness as it is 
perceived in the IS security literature, several more or 
less distinctive definitions are identified. Awareness 
does not only cover aspects of an individual’s 
cognitive state of mind, such as being conscious or 
having knowledge of something (e.g., [7, 13, 35]), 
some definitions also include procedural aspects, i.e. 
the processes used to achieve this state of mind (e.g., 
[43]). Few definitions do not distinguish awareness 
from a certain kind of behavior (e.g., [18, 38]).  
By understanding information security awareness 
(ISA) as cognitive state of mind, Bulgurcu et al. [7] 
distinguish the concept into the overall knowledge 
and understanding about security issues and their 
potential consequences on the one hand, and about 
requirements prescribed in the organization’s 
information security policies on the other hand. A 
further example is provided by Rhee et al. [35], who 
define ISA as “the vigilance in understanding various 
information security threats and in perceiving one’s 
vulnerability related to these threats” (p. 2). In 
contrast, Tsohou et al. [43] regard ISA as “a process 
that aims at changing individuals’ perceptions, 
values, attitudes, behavior, norms, work habits, and 
organizational culture and structures with regard to 
secure information practices” (p. 1). Behavioral 
aspects are considered by Spears and Barki [38] who 
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regard ISA as a state reflected in the behavior of 
target groups (e.g., employees) and by Galvez and 
Guzman [18] who consider ISA as one of the 
information security behaviors. 
In the remainder of the review, we consider ISA 
from the cognitive state of mind perspective to 
clearly differentiate it from the awareness-raising 
processes and subsequent outcome factors, such as 
behavioral reactions. This perspective implies that 
awareness-raising processes (i.e., antecedents of ISA) 
represent input variables of ISA, whereas the 
subsequent belief, attitudinal and behavioral reactions 
represent output variables. 
 
3.2 Antecedents of ISA 
 
This section reviews publications proposing or 
empirically investigating antecedents of ISA. The 
antecedents are organized based on their levels of 
origin: individual factors, organizational factors, 
social-environmental factors, and technological 
factors. In the following, a summary of these factors 
is provided. 
 
3.2.1. Individual antecedents. The individual level 
includes factors originating from the employee or IS 
user. An individual’s general IS knowledge has been 
empirically found as a determinant of ISA, since the 
higher their knowledge of basic IS applications the 
more likely individuals are aware of security-related 
issues [21, 36]. Previous negative experience with 
information security incidents has been found to lead 
to higher levels of an individual’s ISA [21]. On the 
other hand, computer anxiety (i.e., the fears users feel 
in working with computers) has been found to 
negatively impact users’ awareness of security 
measures [29]. 
 
3.2.2. Organizational antecedents. The 
organizational level covers factors under the 
influence of an organization. It is suggested that the 
formalization of work procedures, which make it 
more likely that awareness-increasing security 
controls exist, organizational IS security 
communication, and the individual’s perception of 
value of information increases an individual’s ISA 
through a heightened perception of the importance of 
information protection [20]. In addition, 
management’s support of IS security initiatives by 
championing them is considered to be a main driver 
for making each individual aware of the importance 
of information security and evoking a company-wide 
ISA [25]. Furthermore, information security policies 
(ISPs) are considered to be an important information 
security management practice and the provision and 
promotion of IPSs has been empirically found to be 
an effective organizational practice to increase 
individuals’ awareness of information security issues 
[21]. Another important information security 
management practice to increase ISA of various 
stakeholders are security education, training, and 
awareness raising (SETA) programs. SETA 
programs aim to increase employees’ security 
expertise, to develop security-relevant skills and 
competencies, and to make them aware of the 
importance of security and potential security issues 
(e.g. risks, threats) as well as procedures, rules, and 
procedures stated in the ISPs [13, 39, 47]. Empirical 
support for SETA programs increasing individuals’ 
ISA has been provided by several studies [9, 13, 21, 
39]. Another valuable method for raising ISA is the 
involvement of IS end-users in the development 
process of organizational information security 
controls. Spears and Barki [38], for instance, applied 
user participation theories and empirically 
demonstrated that users’ participation in security risk 
management processes contributed to an increased 
awareness of organizational policies, procedures and 
security risks along different target groups.  
 
3.2.3. Social-environmental antecedents. The 
social-environmental level incorporates factors not 
under the direct influence of the organization’s 
management and originates from individuals’ 
interaction with their social environment. Hadasch et 
al. [20] proposed that public expectations of 
information protection as well as security 
requirements from regulatory bodies and business 
partners heighten an individual’s ISA through the 
individual’s perception of information leakage 
incidents as being a threat. Secondary sources (e.g. 
media information about security issues) have a 
positive impact on ISA by awakening interest and 
knowledge about information security [21, 33]. 
Social learning cues that positively impact 
employees’ awareness of organizational ISPs include 
security-related peer behavior (also termed vicarious 
experience) [21, 27], situational support (i.e., the 
degree to which employees perceive their task 
environment favors ISP compliance) and verbal 
persuasion (i.e., feedback or instructions received by 
others to support ISP compliance) [27]. Albeit not 
empirically tested, it is suggested that public 
awareness campaigns or awareness programs are 
possible measures to raise users’ awareness and 
sensitize them towards protecting their data [28]. 
 
3.2.4. Technological antecedents. Influencing 
factors at the technological level originate from 
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technical tools with integrated awareness features 
that were designed and developed with the objective 
to increase users’ ISA in specific software 
applications by alerting the users to possible security 
threats that may arise. Just-in-time reminders in the 
form of pop-ups as SETA program components 
intended to raise employees’ ISA attract employees’ 
attention and reminds them of what has been learned 
in previous security training about, for instance, 
disclosing customer information [26]. Similarly, the 
frequency of received information security warning 
messages was proposed but not yet empirically tested 
to increase individuals’ levels of ISA [49].  
 
3.3 Outcomes of ISA  
 
The outcomes of ISA also received considerable 
attention in research. Most of these factors were 
analyzed using the perspective of the theory of 
reasoned action (TRA; [17]) and the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB; [1]). This includes belief 
factors, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual 
behaviors, which are summarized in the following. 
 
3.3.1. Beliefs. We identified 17 variables through 
which ISA indirectly affects attitudes, behavioral 
intentions, and actual behaviors (owing to the 
limitations of space, definitions are not provided but 
are available from the authors upon request). These 
variables relate to behavioral beliefs, instrumental 
beliefs, and normative beliefs. 
With regard to behavioral beliefs, an individual’s 
increased ISA leads to the formation of outcome 
beliefs of a certain kind of behavior. For instance, 
ISA is positively associated with beliefs about the 
benefit of ISP compliant behavior, which include 
intrinsic benefit, safety, rewards [7], perceived 
response efficacy [34], and ISP-related personal 
norms [48]. Further, ISA is associated with beliefs 
about the costs of ISP compliant behavior, which 
includes a negative relationship with work 
impediment [7] and a positive relationship with 
perceived response cost [34]. With regard to beliefs 
about the cost of noncompliant behavior, ISA is 
positively associated with intrinsic cost, 
vulnerability, and sanctions [7]. Sanctions have also 
been considered as a dyadic construct including 
perceived certainty of sanctions and perceived 
severity of sanctions, which are positively influenced 
by user awareness of security countermeasures 
(security policies, SETA programs, and computer 
monitoring) [10, 12, 13, 24]. With regard to 
instrumental beliefs about adopting technologies, ISA 
positively influences both perceived usefulness (e.g., 
of firewalls to protect home computers [29] and of 
ISPs [2]) and perceived ease of use (e.g., of ISPs [2]). 
With regard to normative beliefs, ISA positively 
influences subjective norm about using protective 
technologies, such as antispyware software [14], and 
social norms about acceptable ISP compliant 
behavior [4]. 
 
3.3.2. Attitudes. Following TRA and TPB, attitude is 
the direct outcome of beliefs, which was examined in 
many studies. Several studies found empirical 
evidence that ISA positively impacts attitudes toward 
ISPs compliance directly [4–7] and indirectly via 
several belief factors [6, 7]. Similarly, Dinev and Hu 
[14] showed that technology awareness positively 
influenced attitude toward using security 
technologies (e.g., anti-spyware software) and Kumar 
et al. [29] showed a direct positive effect of 
awareness of security measures on attitude towards 
using a firewall and an indirect positive impact via 
perceived usefulness.  
 
3.3.3. Behavioral intentions. Behavioral intention 
has an essential role in human behavior [1, 17]. 
Empirical studies in this area have been categorized 
into two fields with regard to whether they refer to 
behavior that is supportive vs. disruptive of security. 
Examples of behavioral intentions that are supportive 
of security include intentions to comply with ISPs [3, 
7, 21, 34, 37] and to adopt security technologies [14, 
22, 29, 31]. Examples of behavioral intentions that 
are disruptive of security include intention to commit 
IS access policy violation [44] and to misuse IS [13, 
24]. Here, the general conclusion is that ISA has a 
positive impact on behavioral intentions that are 
supportive of security and a negative impact on 
intentions that are disruptive of security. 
  
3.3.4. Actual behaviors. Several studies also 
analyzed the impact of ISA on actual behavior. 
Following the same two-field classification as 
described in the previous subsection, examples of 
actual behaviors that are supportive of security 
include controlling insider threats to information 
security [47], information security practices at work 
[18], coping with system risk [39], managerial 
actions toward information security [8], ISP 
compliant behavior [48], and desktop security 
behaviors [23, 46]. The first two studies are of 
conceptual nature and propose that ISA may be a 
major factor in reducing insider threats and 
increasing security practices at work. The last five 
studies find empirical evidence that ISA positively 
impacts managers’ coping behavior with system risk 
and their actions towards information security, 
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increases employees’ ISP compliance, and improves 
home users’ desktop security behaviors.  
In contrast, actual security disruptive behaviors 
include problematic IS security behavior [40] and 
unauthorized information disclosure [26]. Takemura 
[40], for instance, found that problematic IS security 
behavior with regard to organizational information 
security measures is reduced significantly when 
individuals have higher levels of ISA.  
 
3.4 Moderating effects involving ISA  
 
Some studies examined factors that moderate the 
relationship between ISA and outcome variables. 
Computer self-efficacy and perceived virtual status 
were found to negatively moderate the effects of ISA 
on unauthorized access intentions [11]. Further, the 
relationship between social learning cues and ISA has 
been weaker for remote employees in comparison to 
in-house employees, suggesting a moderating role of 
“remote” status [27]. Further studies have proposed 
that personality attributes and traits (e.g., 
conscientiousness; [32]) might have an important role 
in the relationship between ISA and security 
behavior. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The review identified multiple antecedents and 
outcomes related to information security awareness 
(ISA) and building a holistic view of these factors is 
important for additional research and practice. 
Based on our review, an integrative framework 
for the study on ISA as an individual’s cognitive state 
of mind is provided in Figure 1. The central construct 
in this figure is ISA, with its antecedents originating 
from the individual, organizational, social-
environmental, and technological level (on the left) 
as well as its outcomes and their relationships (on the 
right). The literature review described in detail the, so 
that the emphasis in the following is to work out 
prescriptions for future research using the insights of 
the literature review and the framework. Dotted 
circles in Figure 1 indicate where the prescriptions fit 
into the framework. 
 
4.1. Prescriptions from the definition of 
awareness analysis  
 
The first objective was to analyze how ISA is 
perceived and conceptualized in the information 
security community by looking at the various 
definitions. Although a considerable amount of 
research has been done, a coherent conceptualization 
of awareness is lacking. While a concerning amount 
of studies do not provide an explicit definition, the 
analysis showed that ISA is perceived as a 
multidimensional issue covering cognitive, process, 
and behavioral aspects. 
 
Information 
security 
awareness
Actual 
behavior
Behavioral 
intention
Instrumental beliefs
1. Perceived usefulness
2. Perceived ease of use 
Individual factors
1. IS knowledge 
2. Negative experience
3. Computer anxiety (-)
Attitude
Organizational factors
1. Formalization of work procedures
2. Security communication
3. Perceived value of information
4. Management support
5. ISP provision
6. SETA programs
7. User participation
Social-environmental factors
1. Public expectations of information 
protection
2. Security requirements from 
regulatory bodies and business 
partners
3. Security-related peer behavior
4. Secondary sources‘ influence
5. Situational support
6. Verbal persuasion
7. Public awareness campaigns
Technological factors
1. Security warning messages
2. Just-in-time reminders
Behavioral beliefs
1. Intrinsic benefit 
2. Safety of resources
3. Rewards 
4. Perceived response efficacy 
5. ISP-related personal norms
6. Work impediment 
7. Perceived response cost
8. Intrinsic cost
9. Vulnerability of resources
10. Perceived certainty of sanctions
11. Perceived severity of sanctions
Normative beliefs 
1. Subjective norms
Control beliefs
1. Perceived behavioral control
2. Self-efficacy
1
2
8
5 6 7
3
4
Figure 1. Integrative framework for the study on information security awareness 
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Accordingly, different understandings of the 
concept of awareness exist, and consequently 
different angles from which it can be approached and 
examined. However, by not clearly separating those 
three aspects but merging them, a diffuse and 
partially inconsistent understanding of the term 
prevails.  
The revelation of terminology ambiguity implies 
a need for future research to create a well-defined set 
of terms for awareness, since a consistent 
understanding of the subject matter is crucial for 
value-adding studies. The study findings and insights 
could be considered as a starting point to further 
examine the conceptualization and nature of 
awareness. We suggest that research should explicitly 
indicate which aspect of awareness (either cognitive, 
process, or behavior) is examined. This helps to 
clearly specify the impact of the antecedent factors 
and the effect on the outcome factors. In particular, 
our integrative framework (Figure 1) implies that 
awareness raising processes represent an input 
variable of ISA (as a cognitive state of mind), 
whereas behavior represents an output variable. The 
first prescription includes: 
1. Overcome terminology ambiguity by establishing 
a basic consensus of the nature of awareness and 
by differentiating ISA as a cognitive state of 
mind from awareness-raising activities and 
subsequent behaviors. 
Current research predominantly relies on static 
aspects of ISA, such as the general knowledge and 
understanding of security threats and information 
security policies (e.g., [7]). However, static 
awareness concepts are often formed before 
individuals perform a security-relevant behavior and 
thus do not reflect situation-specific aspects of the 
process individuals follow while performing secure 
behavior. Individuals may be considered security 
aware in general, but in a certain usage situation they 
might be unaware that they are confronted with a 
security-related issue. Little attention has been paid 
to the role that a specific situation plays in regulating 
awareness and its behavioral outcomes. We propose 
to consider situational aspects in explaining 
individuals’ security-related behavior by 
conceptualizing and examining individuals’ level of 
situation awareness of security threats. The three-
level model of situation awareness [16] could be used 
as a theoretical foundation and an individual’s 
perception, comprehension, and projection of 
information security threats could be measured by 
applying experimental study designs. Hence: 
2. Reflect individuals’ level of situation awareness 
in information security to further investigate the 
concept of ISA. 
 
4.1. Prescriptions from the antecedents of 
awareness analysis 
 
Within the in-depth analysis, a broad set of 
determinants are discovered and classified into 
individual, organizational, social-environmental, and 
technological influencing factors of awareness 
according to their levels of origin.  
On the individual level, general IS knowledge, 
negative experience with incidents and computer 
anxiety were found to determine ISA. As research on 
individual-level antecedents is limited, more attention 
towards them is still required. Further individual-
level antecedents, such as personality traits, 
demographics (age, gender, education, income) or 
characteristics (workload, overall job attitude, 
organizational commitment) should be examined 
with empirical research. One particular direction for 
future research could be to investigate the 
individuals’ hierarchy level in a company, i.e. 
whether factors influencing employees’ ISA (as it has 
been mainly examined in the reviewed studies) also 
influence managers’ ISA (which has been largely left 
unregarded). This line of research is particularly 
important in light of a study done by Taylor [41] who 
identified an optimistic bias among managers, in 
particular managers were unaware of the security risk 
arising from employees’ unintentional actions. 
Hence: 
3. Study different types of stakeholders while 
further investigating influencing factors of ISA. 
On the organizational level, SETA programs and 
the provision of ISPs have been identified as 
important security management practices to increase 
an individual’s ISA. Whereas these security 
management practices focus on non-technical means 
to increase an individual’s ISA, future research 
should aim to explore further potential antecedents, 
which are of technical nature. For this purpose, the 
effectiveness of tools providing information about 
security issues or referring to the organization’s ISPs 
immediately before a foreseeable security breach 
(e.g., an ISP violation) in raising an individual’s ISA 
could be examined. This line of thought has been 
investigated in information privacy research (e.g., 
warning mechanisms provided by tools before 
disclosing personal information), but with few 
exceptions neglected to a large extent in information 
security research. Thus: 
4. Further investigate the effectiveness of technical 
means to increase ISA. 
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4.2. Prescriptions from the outcomes of 
awareness analysis 
 
The last focus of this review was to provide 
insights into outcomes of awareness and associated 
relationships with other constructs. The in-depth 
analysis has shown that an individual’s ISA is 
regarded as one of the central antecedents of behavior 
that is supportive or disruptive of security. However, 
there are several limitations to the empirical studies 
investigating the effect of ISA on security-related 
behavior.  
Many studies are conducted in western cultures 
(e.g., USA), thereby neglecting possible cultural 
differences. However, findings of Hovav and D’Arcy 
[24] indicate that cultural differences associated with 
ISA’s impact on IS misuse might exist between 
South Korean and US users. Further insights into the 
relationship between ISA and security-related 
behavior with samples from different countries needs 
to be gained. In addition to cross-cultural differences 
with regard to cultural values (e.g., power distance, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance), regulatory 
structures (omnibus, sectoral, or non-regulation/self-
help) might differ across countries and should be 
examined in greater detail. Thus: 
5. Further investigate cross-cultural differences 
involving ISA and security-related behavior. 
With the increasing use of private devices (e.g., 
private smartphones, home computers) to access 
organizational IS and the blurring boundaries 
between work and personal business, security-related 
behavior is also relevant in contexts outside of the 
organization. However, many studies focus on 
behaviors of individuals within organizational 
settings. Remote employees, for instance, are an 
understudied class of employees who tend to exhibit 
lower levels of ISA in comparison with their in-house 
colleagues [27]. As organizational security practices 
may be less prevalent in remote workplaces and own 
practices of security protection may be more 
dominant, potential distinctions in ISA and its 
relationship with behavior regarding different work 
settings should be analyzed. Hence: 
6. Consider the influence of ISA on behavior in 
contexts outside of the organization. 
Some studies indicate that individual 
characteristics (personality attributes and traits) may 
moderate the relationship between ISA and behavior. 
However, few studies address the effects of 
individual characteristics on this relationship 
empirically. Understanding the differences between 
individuals is essential to understanding underlying 
psychological mechanisms impacting the relationship 
between ISA and behavior. Thus, the effects of 
demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, education, 
income), personality traits (e.g., Big Five personality 
traits), and psychological states (e.g., a psychological 
need for safety, risk-taking propensity) should be 
further investigated with cumulative research. Thus: 
7. Conduct additional research for a better 
understanding of moderating effects involving 
ISA and behavior. 
Finally, several studies used very static and 
generic measures for behavioral intention, like ISP 
compliance [7, 34] or IS misuse intentions [13, 24]. 
Further studies could enquire situation-specific 
behaviors, i.e. behavioral reactions at the moment 
that a security-related event occurs. For instance, 
upon receiving a phishing mail, security aware 
employees may try to verify the sender address, 
delete it and/or inform colleagues or the IT 
department in the organization. On the other hand, 
unaware employees may download a malicious 
attachment followed by executing it. By capturing the 
nuances of the process individuals follow while 
performing secure or unsecure behavior, new insights 
into the complex interaction of information 
processing (how employees become aware of a 
threat) and decision making can be gained. Thus: 
8. Apply more situation-specific measures of ISA 
and behavior. 
 
4.3. Theoretical and practical implications 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several 
ways by providing a comprehensive review of studies 
on individual’s ISA and creating a holistic picture of 
the construct and its relationship with several 
antecedent and outcome factors.  
First, researchers are advised to explicitly indicate 
which type and aspect of awareness, either cognitive, 
process, or behavior, is examined in their study on 
ISA. This contributes to unambiguously determining 
the impact of the antecedent factors and the effect on 
the outcome factors. Further, the categorization of 
antecedent factors into four levels of origin may help 
empirical studies to structure their factors and by 
considering all four levels in their research help to 
provide a more comprehensive picture. Last but not 
least, the categorization of behaviors according to 
their supportive vs. disruptive nature helps to identify 
which kind of behaviors have been neglected by prior 
studies and should be further examined. Naturally, it 
is desirable that the framework for ISA research 
based on the in-depth analysis is empirically tested in 
whole or in blocks using surveys or experiments, or 
by conducting meta-analyses on prior research.  
For practitioners, identifying and understanding 
the different types of antecedents of ISA at four 
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different levels yields crucial insights to ensure the 
success of information security objectives and 
encourage the desired security-related behavior. A 
combination of antecedents at different levels seems 
promising. For instance, managers could increase 
their employees’ ISA not only through SETA 
programs and ISPs but also by identifying and 
supporting security-aware employees, who champion 
information security awareness among other 
employees (since observing peers’ compliant 
behavior has been found to increase ISA).  
For individuals, several factors influencing their 
security-related behaviors were highlighted. A 
selected combination of the identified antecedents of 
awareness may help individuals to become equipped 
with the necessary knowledge and skills to make 
informed decisions on how to deal with security 
issues.  
 
4.4. Limitations of the literature review  
 
Although this literature review provides valuable 
insights into the concept of awareness within IS 
security research and points to several research gaps, 
some limitations need to be considered. First, the 
findings of this review are limited by the selection of 
the literature. The review is based on a 
comprehensive evaluation of peer-reviewed journals 
and conference proceedings. Although the inclusion 
of publications of controlled quality ensures a high 
quality of the literature base, some relevant 
contributions may be missing in the review due to the 
exclusion of non-peer-reviewed publications. Second, 
the search and selection process further restricts the 
results. In particular, the search term applied is 
limited to the English language by which publications 
in other languages are neglected. Third, this research 
considers only awareness-related constructs in the 
information security realm. A comparison with 
similar constructs such as security knowledge or 
mindfulness could help to enhance knowledge of the 
employees’ cognitive states of mind related to 
security. 
In conclusion, research on information security 
awareness is still an evolving field with many 
uncharted areas to be explored. Further empirical 
studies that build upon the research opportunities 
recognized in this study are needed.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Literature reviewed in the study and unit of analysis (1-3) 
Author Outlet Definition 
(1) 
Antecedents 
(2) 
Outcomes 
(3) 
Author Outlet Definition 
(1) 
Antecedents 
(2) 
Outcomes 
(3) 
[2] MWAIS A  * [24] IM A  * 
[3] HICSS A  * [25] JSIS  *  
[4] SIGMIS A * * [26] ICIS   * 
[5] IM A * * [27] JOEUC A *  
[6] AMCIS A  * [28] IM  *  
[7] MISQ A * * [29] DSS   * 
[8] IMCS A  * [33] AMCIS A *  
[9] MISQE   * [34] ECIS   * 
[10] JISSEC A  * [35] ICIS A   
[11] JBE A  * [36] AMCIS  *  
[12] CACM A  * [37] IMCS A,C * * 
[13] ISR A  * [38] MISQ A,C *  
[14] JAIS A,C  * [39] MISQ  * * 
[15] ECIS B *  [40] JMPP A *  
[18] AMCIS A,C  * [43] EJIS B *  
[19] IM   * [44] JMIS   * 
[20] ECIS  *  [46] JCIS   * 
[21] ICIS A * * [47] ECIS  * * 
[22] JCIS A  * [48] DSS A  * 
[23] ISM A  * [49] ICIS A * * 
Note: A = cognitive aspects; B = process aspects; C = behavioural aspects. CACM = Communications of the ACM; DSS = 
Decision Support Systems; ECIS = Proceedings of the European Conference on Information Systems; EJIS = European Journal 
of Information Systems; IM = Information & Management; IMCS = Information Management & Computer Security; HICSS = 
Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences; ICIS = Proceedings of the International Conference 
on Information Systems; IJEC = International Journal of Electronic Commerce; ISM = Information Systems Management; ISR 
= Information Systems Research; JAIS = Journal of the Association for Information Systems; JBE = Journal of Business 
Ethics; JCIS = Journal of Computer Information Systems; JISSEC = Journal of Information System Security; JMIS = Journal 
of Management Information Systems; JMPP = Journal of Management Policy and Practice; JOEUC = Journal of 
Organizational and End User Computing; JSIS = The Journal of Strategic Information Systems; MISQ = Management 
Information Systems Quarterly; MISQE = MIS Quarterly Executive; MWAIS = Proceedings of the Midwest United States 
Association for Information Systems; SIGMIS = ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in Information 
Systems 
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